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I. Introduction 
 
Turkey and NATO are experiencing a mutual crisis of confidence. Turkish policy makers lack 
confidence in NATO guarantees and fear abandonment—both prominent historical concerns. At 
the same time, policy makers within the alliance have begun to question Turkey’s intentions and 
future strategic orientation, and how well they align with NATO’s. One important factor 
contributing to this mistrust is Turkey’s recent dealings with Russia. Turkey is trying to contain 
Russian military expansion in the Black Sea and Syria by calling for a stronger NATO presence 
at the same time that is seeking to diversify its security strategy by improving ties with Russia 
and reducing its dependence on the United States and NATO.  
 
Turkey’s contradictory stance is no more apparent than in its evolving policy regarding the 
Syrian civil war. The threat topography of NATO’s southern flank reflects a complex web of 
state and non-state actors involved in asymmetric warfare. The Turkish shoot down of a Russian 
jet in 2015 highlighted the complexity and helped to precipitate military dialogue between 
NATO and Russia in Syria. Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President 
Tayyip Erdogan seem to have overcome their strategic differences in their preferred outcome for 
Syria and have de-escalated the tensions following several rounds of peace talks headed by 
Russia, Turkey, and Iran and involving some, but not all, factions involved in the Syrian conflict.    
 
Yet several important questions about Turkish security policy and its impact on Turkish-
U.S./NATO relations remain. What are the security implications of Turkey’s military actions on 
the southern flank? How is the continued fight against extremism in the region, including ISIS, 
likely to affect relations? And how should the West respond to Turkey’s security ties with 
Russia, including the Russian sale of advance military equipment to Ankara? The answers to all 
of these questions depend in part on whether Turkey’s behavior with Russia in Syria is a tactical 
move or a strategic shift away from NATO. Understanding these dynamics is key to devising 
policies and actions to minimize security risks between the U.S., NATO, and Russia.  
 
This paper argues that Turkey has economic and political interests in developing closer relations 
with Russia, but that these interests are not as strong as Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West, 
and NATO in particular. Turkish policymakers, who lack confidence in NATO, are pursuing 
short-term security interests in Syria as a way to leverage Western acquiescence to their interests 
regarding the Kurdish populations in Syria and Iraq. These objectives, however, are not aligned 
with Russia’s security objectives and do not add up to a sustainable long-term regional security 
strategy. In the short term, Turkey’s contradictory approaches to relations with NATO and 
Russia are likely to lead to ambiguity and confusion in the regional security architecture, with 
Syria being the most visible example of this disarray.  
 
To combat this approach, U.S. leadership and NATO should work to convince Turkey that the 
alliance takes Turkish security concerns in Syria seriously and to minimize the risks of Turkey’s 
acts as a spoiler in the region. For instance, addressing Turkish concerns over Washington’s 
arming of the Kurdish rebel group, the YPG, in northern Syria, will go a long way to resolving 
the key issue motivating Turkey’s decision to partner with Russia.  
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The NATO-Turkey standoff 
 
Turkey’s fit in NATO has been questioned since the day in 1948 when Turkish officials told 
their American counterparts of Turkey’s desire to join the alliance. During the Cold War, 
Turkey’s vulnerability to a Soviet attack and Turkey’s insistence on getting a formal security 
guarantee from the United States led U.S. officials to reevaluate Turkey’s value to the alliance, 
particularly in denying the Soviets the control of the Turkish Straits.  At the time, Turkish 
foreign policy prioritized NATO membership over involvement in the Middle East as a way to 
minimize security risks and maintain friendly and cautious relations with its neighbors. Turkey 
sought to establish itself as a trustworthy ally and based its defense planning and command 
structure around the alliance.  
 
Despite their country formally joining NATO in 1952, Turkish officials lacked confidence in 
U.S./NATO security guarantees and reassurances absent domestic military deployments or 
concrete military agreements. These concerns have shaped Turkish policymakers’ decisions and 
functioned as solidarity tests and as mutual confidence-breaking incidents. When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, Turkey feared that it had lost its defining role in the alliance. As such, in the 
1990s, Turkey began to replace its exclusive orientation towards NATO with policies that 
engaged its Mideast neighbors to make progress on the Kurdish issue, water conflict with Syria 
and Iraq, and its need for economic expansion. Turkish security policymaking continues to 
promote engagement outside of NATO to enhance Turkish strategic interest.  
 
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002, Turkey pursued a 
cooperative-preventive security strategy that was consistent with the shift in NATO policies. 
When President Obama visited Turkey in April 2010, he referred to a “model strategic 
partnership,” entailing additional instruments for regional stability to strengthen the NATO 
alliance through multilateralism.1 Since then, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has been on a 
downward spiral, and Turkey has lost its interlocutor role in the region. The situation has been 
worsened by AKP leaders’ ideological and value-driven orientation toward the Middle East, in 
which they seek influence beyond security, as well as by Erdogan’s leadership style and 
escalatory rhetoric.  
 
The divergence between Turkey’s and U.S./NATO’s definitions of threats has grown further due 
to Turkey’s economic and political ambitions in the Middle East. As a showcase of the “zero 
problems with neighbors” policy, Erdogan initially cultivated close relations with Bashar al-
Assad. In 2009, visa restrictions were waived reciprocally and Syria was named a strategic 
partner. Yet, AKP policymakers were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and the civil 
conflict in Syria. The war has destabilized the Middle East in general, leading to the 
development of terrorist groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS; refugee flows into Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq; and humanitarian emergencies. All of these factors have isolated 
Turkey. 
 
Turkey consistently called for a no-fly zone and ground operations to help stop the conflict, yet 
its entanglement in the Kurdish conflict, its sectarian politics in support of other Sunni groups, 
and its prioritization of Assad’s removal over the fight against ISIS have led to major differences 
                                                
1 Namik Tan, “Turkish-US strategic partnership,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 1, 2011.  
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with U.S. priorities in the region. The main test case of these differences was in Kobani in 
October 2014, when ISIS attacked the Syrian Kurdish border town and the U.S. helped save the 
town despite Turkey’s concerns over U.S. cooperation with Syrian Kurds.2 
 
In Syria, Turkey insists that the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) is a direct affiliate of 
the Kurdish Workings Party (PKK) in Turkey. It heavily criticizes U.S. military cooperation with 
the PYD, and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). In Iraq, Turkey initially 
partnered with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), yet the United States was concerned 
about Turkey training and equipping Kurdish peshmerga to fight ISIS as it partnered with 
Baghdad.3 Despite the 2017 KRG independence referendum, to which both Turkey and the 
United States were opposed, Turkey continues to support anti-ISIS operations as long as the 
YPG is not involved. This conditional approach has isolated Ankara further and led to its 
marginalization both in Syria and Iraq.  
 
Turkish security policymaking within NATO also became more problematic as Turkey sought 
greater autonomy and as policy making shifted from military to civilian decision makers under 
the AKP government. Erdogan’s call for a stronger domestic defense industry and for decreasing 
Turkey’s dependence on NATO have led to heightened anti-American rhetoric. Turkey has also 
engaged in strategic dialogues with Russia and China, what Erdogan’s senior foreign policy 
advisor calls “outside the transatlantic box” cooperation, and has compartmentalized its 
economic relations from Middle East security issues.4  
 
In the meantime, the uncertainties and complexities of Mideast political and security dynamics, 
especially in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war, have raised the price of 
Turkish engagement. The AKP policy of “zero problems” has sent mixed signals to the region 
and ultimately undermined Ankara’s role as a credible mediator. Turkey is also increasingly 
taking a lonely stance in its regional relations against the Gulf countries and Egypt, as evidenced 
by Turkey’s decision to stand by Qatar and base troops in the country.5  Complicating matters 
further, is the purge in Turkish Armed Forces that followed the July 15th, 2016, failed coup 
attempt and divided the armed forces along conservative, Atlanticist, and Eurasianist lines.6 
While these divisions have always existed, the makeup of the Turkish military has never been so 
uncertain.  
 
As a consequence of the gulf between Turkey and NATO, an increasing number of policy 
makers and officials question whether Turkey still belongs in the Alliance. Opponents to Turkish 
membership argue that Turkey has been “reckless, repressive, and unreliable,”7 violating 
NATO’s core values of democracy and human rights. Proponents argue that NATO still needs 
Turkey militarily. In Turkey, the concern remains that NATO is not doing enough to support 
Turkish security in Syria, and every possible slight is perceived as evidence of waning NATO 
                                                
2 Henri J. Barkey, “The Raqqa Imperative,” The American Interest, April 8, 2016. An angry Erdogan asked: “Why is 
America interested in Kobani, oil, gold, diamonds?” Barkey, 2016, p. 29.  
3 Barkey, 2016, pp. 32-36.  
4 Gulnur Aybet, “Transatlantic Security, NATO, and Turkey,” Turkey Papers, Wilson Center, March 2015, p. 15.  
5 It is the first Turkish base in the Persian Gulf.  
6 Metin Gurcan and Megan Gisclon, “What is the Turkish Military’s Strategic Identity after July 15?,” IPC-
Mercator Policy Brief, September 2016, p. 3.  
7 “Does Turkey Still Belong in NATO?” Room for Debate, The New York Times, March 29, 2016.  
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support. In November 2017, during NATO’s Trident Javelin exercise in Norway, Turkish leaders 
Ataturk and Erdogan were erroneously depicted as collaborators with an enemy state.8 In 
response, Turkey pulled its troops from the exercise, and after apologizing for the mistake, 
NATO leaders have been trying to reassure Turkey. More generally, the lack of Turkish progress 
in the EU membership process has overshadowed its relations with European NATO partners.  
 
 
Challenges to the Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership 
 
The U.S.-Turkey relationship has historically played a dominant role in Turkey-NATO relations. 
Three current policy disagreements between the two countries are the primary source of pressure 
on the bilateral relationship: Turkey’s concern with U.S. support for the PYD in the anti-ISIS 
coalition; Turkey’s prioritization of the fight against the PKK rather than ISIS; and U.S. 
officials’ increasing concern with freedom of speech and media in Turkey.  
 
Another factor in the relationship has been the 2016 coup attempt and the U.S. refusal to 
extradite Fethullah Gulen. Despite tension on this issue, Turkey hopes to maintain high-level 
military dialogues with the United States through defense partnerships.9 Potential roadblocks to 
this type of cooperation—U.S. barriers to defense exports, oversensitivity about technology 
transfer, and administrative delays—however, are ultimately detrimental to the strategic 
relationship and reinforce Turkey’s perception that the U.S. doesn’t value the bilateral 
relationship sufficiently. 
 
Expectations of a “reset” in the bilateral relationship under Donald Trump have not materialized. 
In fact, the Trump administration’s decision to officially arm the YPG in the ongoing offensive 
against ISIS has only exacerbated the central issue in the relationship. U.S. officials sought ways 
to reassure Ankara that the weapons would not be used against Turkish forces in the future and 
offered greater intelligence cooperation in Turkey’s fight against the PKK.10 It has not been 
enough, however, to assure Turkey that the U.S. strategic partnership is sufficient to protect 
Turkish security interests in the long term. Indeed, President Erdogan has argued that providing 
arms to the YPG is a violation of the NATO treaty.11  
 
The bilateral relationship was further enflamed in May 2017 when President Erdogan’s security 
detail attacked protestors outside the Turkish Ambassador’s residence in Washington, D.C., 
during Erdogan’s visit. The “Sheridan Circle” incident led to arrest warrants and to a 
congressional resolution condemning the Turkish officials involved. In response to the incident, 
the Trump administration blocked the sales of U.S.-made handguns and ammunition for use by 
Erdogan’s presidential security forces. In October, both countries suspended issuance of all visas 
when Turkish authorities arrested U.S. consulate employees that they asserted to be Gulenists. 
The federal U.S. case against a Turkish-Iranian gold trader, Reza Zarrab, in New York City, and 
                                                
8 “NATO Apologizes After Erdogan Pulls Troops over Norway Incident,” Military.com, November 17, 2017.   
9 The Turkish government claims that Fethullah Gulen, an imam who resides in Pennsylvania, is the founder and 
leader of the Fethullahist Terror Organization (FETO) and ordered the July 15th failed coup attempt in Turkey.  
10 “U.S. Will Take Weapons from Kurds after Islamic State Defeat: Turkey,” U.S. News, June 22, 2017.  
11 “Turkey to US: Providing arms to YPG violation of NATO rules,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 25, 2017.  
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Hakan Atilla, a state bank official, for violating U.S. sanctions Iran, has also been a sore subject, 
with Erdogan bashing the trial as a U.S. plot to undermine Turkey, despite Zarrab’s guilty plea.  
 
Despite all this soreness in the bilateral relationship, U.S. military personnel and equipment 
continue to be deployed at Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base as part of the fight against ISIS. The base 
also continues to house approximately 50 U.S. B-61 nuclear gravity bombs guarded by U.S. 
troops in underground vaults. Turkey has always used access to Incirlik as a political bargaining 
chip, but U.S. commitment to the base appears to be wavering some, too. Following the most 
recent visa crisis, some U.S. experts have advocated removing some of B-61s and reducing U.S. 
reliance on the base in the counter-ISIS operations.12  
 
 
The Turkey-Russia rollercoaster  
 
Beginning with the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and Russia have had a history of wars 
and deep mistrust. Despite historically seeing Russia as an “enemy,” though Turkey has recently 
expanded its cooperation with Russia as a potential alternative to its troubled relationships with 
both the United States and NATO.  
 
After the Cold War, Turkey was wary of Russia’s political transition and how it would affect its 
relationship with NATO and its neighbors, such as Azerbaijan. As a show of good faith, in 
March 1991, then-Turkish President Turgut Ozal signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighborliness and Cooperation with Russia, as well as a trade agreement.13 Russian efforts 
since to modernize its military, adapt its nuclear posture, and engage in the domestic political 
affairs of its neighbors (including Ukraine) have made Turkey wary of Russia. Yet, under the 
AKP, there has been a tacit agreement between the two to compartmentalize their geopolitical 
disagreements from economic and strategic interests, particularly in energy cooperation.  
 
The first pillar of the countries’ energy ties is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, Turkey’s first 
nuclear plant, which will be built, owned (up to 51 percent), and operated by Russia’s Rosatom. 
The TurkStream natural gas pipeline, which is being built through Turkey to supply Russian gas 
to Europe and bypass Ukraine, is an important second element. (This second effort is seemingly 
incompatible with Western attempts to reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas.)  
 
Both countries also share some political traits. Both have high degrees of suspicion about the 
political motivations of Western countries, particularly in the Middle East. And both have 
increasingly authoritarian regimes, with Presidents Erdogan and Putin having built a close 
personal relationship. Under Erdogan, the geographical limits of Turkish political involvement 
have also expanded into Russia’s Asian backyard. Erdogan has even said Turkey could be 
interested in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)14 led by Russia and China as 
an alternative to European Union membership.15 
                                                
12 “Some Urgent Questions About Turkey,” The New York Times, October 13, 2017.  
13 Mufti, 1998, p. 36.  
14 SCO, originally called the Shanghai Five and renamed in 2001, was established in 1996 to demilitarize the border 
between China and the Former Soviet Union. SCO serves as a forum to discuss economic and security issues such as 
counterterrorism and illicit trafficking, stability in Afghanistan, as well as greater energy cooperation. Andrew 
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The emerging Turkey-Russia relationship, however, has not been immune to crises. Turkish-
Russian relations were stressed by Russian annexation of Crimea because Turkey is particularly 
concerned with the Crimean Tatars. As noted earlier, Turkey also initially called for the removal 
of the Assad regime and heavily criticized Russia’s military buildup in Syria. The countries have 
differed in their counterterrorism strategy: Turkey’s main concern is Kurdish terrorism, and 
Russia’s is political Islam and radical Islamist groups.  
 
These disagreements were exacerbated by the November 2015 Turkish downing of a Russian Su-
24 bomber along the Syrian-Turkish border. Putin labelled the act a “stab in the back.” Turkish 
officials insisted that they repeatedly warned the Russian plane on the emergency channel that it 
had veered into Turkish air space; the Russians claimed that the jet was over Syrian territory 
when it was hit. In the aftermath of the incident, Turkey didn’t rule out engaging additional 
Russian jets that violated its airspace. In response, Russia deployed S-400 anti-aircraft missiles at 
the Hmeimim airbase in Syria and established an “anti-access area denial” (A2AD) exclusion 
zone against the U.S.-led coalition and Turkey.  
 
On the economic front, Russia suspended the reciprocal visa-free regime with Turkey, and 
banned imports from Turkey.16 Russia’s economic sanctions targeted tourism on the Aegean and 
Mediterranean coasts, Turkish construction firms in Russia, and imports of food products, in 
what became known as the “tomato ban.” Potential disruptions in the Turkstream and the 
Akkuyu projects seriously concerned Turkish officials focused on energy security.  
 
The tensions continued into 2016 when Turkey barred a Russian spy plane from performing an 
Open Skies Treaty over-flight.17 Turkish officials insisted that Russia consistently violated 
Turkish airspace despite repeated warnings and criticized both the Assad regime’s and Russia’s 
continued missile and rocket attacks against rebel-held towns near Damascus and Aleppo instead 
of ISIS targets.18 Russia denied the airspace violations and accused Turkey of trading oil with 
ISIS through Erdogan’s family business and preparing for a military incursion into northern 
Syria following the Assad regime’s Russia-backed offensive into Aleppo.  
 
In response to the Turkish shoot down, the NATO foreign ministers agreed on a Turkish air 
defense package to enhance the alliance’s air and naval presence, including maritime patrol 
aircraft and an AWACS platform in the eastern Mediterranean provided by German and Danish 
                                                                                                                                                       
Scheineson, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, March 24, 
2009, at: http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883  
15 Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s quest for a Eurasian Union,” Today’s Zaman, January 27, 2013.  
16 “Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane- what we know,” BBC News, December 1, 2015.  
17 “Dangerous precedent: Turkey denies Russian observation flight along Syrian border,” RT, February 3, 2016.  
NATO-Russia Council Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) directly connected Norway, Poland, and Turkey, and 
facilitated cooperation with the United States. The initiative halted in 2014 to the Ukraine crisis. See: Anya 
Loukianova, “Clouds of Suspicion: Airspace Arrangements, Escalation, and Discord in U.S./NATO-Russian 
Relations,” CISSM Policy Brief, May 2016, p. 6. 
18 “Missiles in Syria kill 50 as schools, hospitals hit, Turkey accuses Russia,” Reuters, February 16, 2016. “Esed ve 
Rusya IHH’nin yardim depolarini vurdu,” TRT Haber, January 10, 2016. “At least 65 Syrians Killed in Government 
Attack,” The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2015. “Turkey condemns attack on Syrian Turkmen village, summons 
Russian envoy,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 20, 2015.  
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ships.19 The new anti-missile defense NATO architecture included an extra deployment of Italian 
surface-to-air missiles in Turkey and an Arleigh Burke-class U.S. destroyer in the Black Sea.20 
The United States also deployed air-to-air combat aircraft to Incirlik. In response, Russia 
deployed at least one Iskander missile system to the Hmeimim Air Base in Syria in March 2016, 
as well as a K-300P Bastion-P anti-ship missile system that can accommodate Yakhont 
missiles.21 
 
Turkey has used the bilateral track to restore relations with Russia and to end Russian sanctions 
on Turkish businesses.22 Erdogan’s letter apologizing about the Russian jet shoot down was 
followed by a Putin-Erdogan summit in August 2016.23 Even the assassination of the Russian 
ambassador to Ankara in December 2016 hasn’t harmed the relationship. In fact, the economic 
cooperation has expanded to include the possible sale of advanced Russian military equipment to 
Turkey. In February 2017, Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik announced that Turkey and 
Russia had made progress in the potential Turkish acquisition of the S-400 air defense system.24 
As of January 2018, both Turkish and Russian officials claim that the S-400 acquisition is a 
“done deal” to be deployed in 2019.25 
 
The potential acquisition raises some fundamental questions: Would a Russian air and missile 
defense system protect Turkey against Russian air power and missiles? But, perhaps more 
importantly, it also revives questions about the interoperability of Turkish military systems with 
NATO. As Turkey chose a stand-alone S-400 system, it will not benefit from NATO’s network-
based Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) and satellite detection capabilities, which 
will significantly deteriorate the system’s performance. The S-400 system could also contradict 
NATO’s aerial assets and the identification, friend or foe (IFF) policy, whether it is NATO 
supporting Turkey in case of conflict or Turkey supporting another NATO ally. As such, NATO 
leaders have tried without success to discourage Turkey from the Russian purchase.   
 
Turkey sees no contradiction in purchasing a stand-alone Russian system and in fulfilling its 
responsibilities as a NATO member. Yet its allies, United States in particular, might force the 
issue. Congress has already warned that Turkey’s purchase of a Russian air defense system 
would violate U.S. sanctions against Russian defense and intelligence sectors and could impact 
U.S. security assistance and arms sales to Turkey.26 In 2018, the U.S. Congress may decide to 
impose sanctions on Turkey.  
 
To the degree that this conflict between NATO and Turkey leads to concerns that Turkey is 
weakening the alliance by eroding cohesion and solidarity, it clearly serves Russian strategic 
                                                
19 “NATO agrees Turkey air defense package, seeks ‘predictability,’” Reuters, December 18, 2015.  
20 “Spain to Stay with Patriots in Turkey, Italy Could Deploy Samp/T Missiles,” Defense News, December 28, 2015.  
21 “Iskander missile launcher spotted in Syria,” IHS Jane’s 360, March 30, 2016. 
22 Trade volume was $35 billion in 2014, but decreased 40% in the first 8 months of 2016.  
23 Gareth Jenkins, “Should the West Fear a Turkey-Russia Convergence?” Center on Global Interests, August 8, 
2016.  
24 “Turkey mulls purchase of Russian S-400 air defense system,” Defense News, February 22, 2017.  
25 Burak Ege Bekdil, “It is a done deal: Turkey plans to deploy Russian air defense system in 2019,” Defense News, 
November 28, 2017. 
26 “Cardin: Turkey’s Purchase of Russian missile system may trigger sanctions,” Politico, September 14, 2017.  
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interests.27 Meanwhile, by not taking a clear stance on the role of Kurds in the region, Russia 
keeps favor with Turkey and balances against the U.S.-NATO presence in the region. In the long 




The Syria Conundrum 
 
Focusing on how Turkey and Russia are using their partnership to solve their own immediate 
problems in Syria is a useful way of assessing the depth of the partnership. Though Russia was 
widely criticized for becoming involved militarily in Syria, Turkey has since warmed to Russian 
involvement in the region and quieted its insistence that “Assad must go.” Indeed, following his 
August 2016 summit with Putin, Erdogan argued that the most important actor for bringing 
peace to Syria is Russia.28  
 
Russia has not substantively changed course in Syria to accommodate Turkish concerns. Russian 
communication channels with the PYD remain open, and Russia ultimately envisions significant 
autonomy for the Syrian Kurds in the future. The PYD has an office in Moscow as the “Western 
Kurdistan Representative,” and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has pushed to invite the 
PYD to the Astana talks.  
 
Turkey has nevertheless found cooperating with Russia more acceptable since Russia has not 
considered arming the PYD as the Americans have. It has supported Turkish efforts to limit the 
reach of Kurdish militias in Northern Syria, providing a more acceptable alternative to dealing 
with the Kurdish issue. 
 
Russia and Turkey are also providing cover for each other in the context of the Astana peace 
talks. Though these talks have followed on the primary efforts to establish a Syrian peace 
process—those of the U.N.-backed biannual Geneva conferences and the Vienna Process led by 
the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—the Astana talks have arguably had the greatest 
impact to date. Under the Astana talks, Turkey and Russia agreed to deploy personnel in Syria’s 
northern Idlib region as part of an effort to establish four de-escalation zones in Syria for at least 
six months.29 The absence in this plan of the United States and the UN, as well as other key 
regional players including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, leave it fragile, but in the short term helps 
both Turkey and Russia achieve their immediate security objectives.  
 
While Turkey and Russia are working together to address immediate challenges in Syria, the 
fundamental objectives of the two countries in the region are ultimately incompatible. The 
confusion over the January 2018 drone attacks on the Russian Hmeimim air base and Tartus 
naval facility proves the uncertainty in the relationship: Russia initially announced that the 
Turkish-backed rebels in Idlib attacked the facilities, then President Putin took back the 
                                                
27 Judy Dempsey, “Judy Assks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, September 20, 2017.  
28 Hale Gonultas, “Will road to Moscow lead Ankara to Damascus?” Al Monitor, August 16, 2016.  
29 “Turkey, Russia, Iran working on Syria de-escalation mechanism involving US, Presidential Spokesperson Kalin 
says,” Daily Sabah, June 22, 2017.  
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accusation the next day.30 Turkey’s main objectives relate to Turkish security from extremist 
threats and the Kurdish issue. For example, its cross-border Operation Euphrates Shield aimed to 
clear the border of both ISIS threats and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is led by the 
YPG. Throughout the conflict, Turkey has been aiming to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish 
corridor along its border, by not allowing the YPG to cross to the west of the Euphrates River. 
Initially, the U.S.-led coalition acquiesced to Turkish operations, and Russia formally approved 
them. However, Turkey’s operations ultimately required coalition support and led to 
disagreement with both the United States and Russia before Turkey ended the operations in 
March 2017.  
 
Russia’s objectives are supporting the Assad regime and ensuring a strategic foothold in the 
region. Russia’s formidable A2/AD capabilities in Syria are focused on avoiding new clashes in 
northern Syria, particularly in the air, and giving the Assad regime enough breathing room to 
consolidate political and security gains. Russia is also fundamentally interested in maintaining 
Turkish support for Russian maritime access to the Black Sea and the TurkStream pipeline 
project to supply Russian gas to Europe.  
 
In addition to their misalignment of fundamental interests, Turkey and Russia’s near-term 
cooperation in Syria faces severe challenges. The most immediate concern is the suspension of 
U.S.-Russian efforts to de-conflict flights over Syria and the general lack of U.S.-Russian 
bilateral engagement.  
 
Turkey’s attempts to play both sides of U.S.-Russian disagreements also seem unsustainable. For 
instance, how would Turkey respond if NATO became more actively involved in the Syrian civil 
war? It is hard to imagine Turkey actively participating, particularly if the NATO action 
countered Russian interests, yet it continues to support increased NATO patrols in the Black Sea 
as a way to counter Russia’s presence there.  
 
 
The Way Forward  
 
At the heart of the NATO/US-Turkey-Russia strategic triangle is a central dilemma: Despite its 
recent cooperation with Russia and the exacerbation of its disagreements with the United States 
and NATO, Turkey’s fundamental security interests are still more likely to be met in 
coordination with the latter than the former. Yet Turkey’s quest for new security and political 
partnerships—other than NATO—has only fed into NATO and U.S. suspicions of Turkey’s 
intentions and made them less likely to give Turkey the reassurances it desires.  
 
It is past time for Turkey to take a critical look at the full range of its own security and political 
objectives and reflect on the best course of action. This analysis suggests that by recommitting 
itself to NATO policies, Turkey would improve U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkey’s role and 
influence within NATO and the Middle East would also be elevated in a way it could never 
achieve through closer cooperation with Russia. 
                                                
30 “Putin tells Erdogan that he knows who was behind attack on Russia’s Syria bases,” Daily Sabah, January 11, 
2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2018/01/11/putin-tells-erdogan-that-he-knows-who-was-behind-
attack-on-russias-syria-bases  
The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle 11 
 
This is not to say that Turkey shouldn’t continue to work with Russia on important security 
issues, particularly in Syria. Turkey, Russia, and NATO all share a range of security concerns, 
including the flow of refugees from the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Raqqa, humanitarian assistance 
to Syrians displaced by the conflict, and the flow of foreign fighters traveling through Russia and 
NATO countries. Indeed, all parties in the strategic triangle see Islamic radicalization as a 
common threat. By rolling back ISIS’s territorial gains, the United States, Russia, and Turkey 
have damaged its capacity to organize and conduct attacks. These efforts have not been able to 
eliminate the remaining support for radical groups’ in Syria and Iraq or the group’s broader 
legitimacy. Moreover, differences in how the countries define terrorism and their prioritization of 
the threats, however, risk undercutting their efforts.  
 
Encouraging better political and military coordination between NATO/U.S. and Russia in Syria, 
would be a good first step for Turkish policy makers to take toward solidifying their recent 
successes in the conflict. Turkey’s current push for greater military involvement in the conflict 
does not appear to be welcome by any of the other parties involved. Turkey has a role to play in 
the deconfliction of military activities in Syria, but the bulk of this work should be managed 
through direct NATO-Russian interactions. Turkish policy makers would do well to facilitate 
these types of contacts. 
 
This approach would also tacitly recognize that NATO remains the backbone of Turkish defense 
planning. As such, Turkey’s military decisions should complement, not contradict, its 
commitment to the alliance. In return, the United States and NATO should be prepared to come 
up with additional reassurance mechanisms to reduce Turkey’s threat perceptions in Syria and in 
the region. NATO’s unwillingness to respond fully to Turkey’s security concerns on the southern 
flank is likely to cause significant damage to the alliance over time. By working together to 
develop and implement a comprehensive Syria security strategy, the Trump administration and 
NATO leadership would be in a better position to solidify Turkey’s role in the alliance and to 
protect the integrity of it more generally.  
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